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The Law School and the American Society of Intetnational Law were joint sponsors ofa Conference on International Law and the Mid­
dle East Crisis; the Conference was held on the Quadrangles in April. The papers which follow were delivered at that Conference.
The Middle East Crisis and Develop­
ments in International Law
By LEONARD C. MEEKER
Assistant Legal Adviserfor United Nations Affairs. Department of State
I have been asked to talk this afternoon about develop­
ments in international law related to the Middle East crisis
of the last few months, particularly as those developments
are connected with the actions of the United Nations. This
is a rather large order when we consider the number and
range of legal questions which have emerged from events
in the Middle East and which have in a number of instances
come before the United Nations. It is also necessary to in­
clude, here, constitutional developments in the United Na­
tions Organization itself, following on these Middle Eastern
events. My purpose is primarily to raise questions, knowing
that answers are difficult to reach, if attainable at all.
A catalogue of major legal issues might run as follows:
Was Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal valid, and
what legal effects are to be attributed to it?
How were the military operations against Egypt by
Israel, France, and Great Britain to be characterized, and
what measures were to be taken in consequence?
Was the obstruction of the Suez Canal and of the flow of
oil through international pipelines justified?
Does Egypt have valid claims for war damages against
Israel, France, and Great Britain? Do the decrees providing
for Egyptianization of foreign business enterprises in Egypt
give rise to justifiable international claims?
What are the rights of navigation in such waterways as
the Suez Canal, the Strait ofTiran, and the GulfofCAqaba?
NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL
In talking about the Middle East crisis, a convenient
point of beginning is the nationalization of the Suez Canal
by Egypt lastJuly. Was the action lawful and valid? Did the
compensation offered by Egypt meet the requirements of
international law? Would the nationalization be accorded
extraterritorial effect as to assets of the Suez Canal Com­
pany outside Egypt? Are shipowners paying tolls to Egypt
protected from lawsuits which might be brought by the
company for the same tolls? Professor Olmstead has already
given us a comprehensive view of the various legal ques­
tions raised by the Suez nationalization, so I shall refer here
only briefly to certain aspects which have particularly con­
cerned the United States government.
On the question ofvalidity, the argument has been made
that the Suez Canal is an international public utility to
Continued on page 5
Nationalization ofProperty: The Suez
Canal Company Case
By CECIL OLMSTEAD
Professor ofLaw and Director of the Middle East Institute
New York University
During the post-World War II decade rising economic and
social demands of peoples in some of the less-developed
areas of the world have sometimes manifested themselves in
governmental taking of foreign-owned enterprises. In some
of these quarters the beliefpersists that governmental opera­
tion ofenterprise will accelerate economic and social devel­
opment. These takings, variously termed "nationaliza­
tions," "expropriations," or "confiscations," have been
legally rationalized as being exercises of sovereignty or acts
of state.
Because of the contemporary interest of both capital­
exporting and capital-importing countries in foreign in­
vestment of a private nature, examination of the legal and
policy problems raised by nationalizations and similar tak­
ings of foreign-owned holdings appears desirable. A prin­
cipal focal point to be developed is the legal effect of gov­
ernmental takings ofproperties and other interests operated
by foreign enterprise pursuant to a valid agreement be­
tween the government and such enterprise.
The history of governmental takings seems to be as long
as recordation. Early takings of private property did not
typically present international problems, for in the usual
case the property was locally owned and the sovereign took
it through the exercise ofeminent domain. The doctrine of
eminent domain developed in an era when international
investment was of little or no consequence and, therefore,
did not affect foreign interests. Furthermore, the practice of
eminent domain, at this early date, was limited in scope and
subject matter, and the character of the sovereign was in­
deed that of a personal sovereign frequently accorded a
measure of divine right. Even a sovereign in this historic
sense, however, was limited in the exercise of eminent do­
main to a taking for a public purpose. Such a purpose in
this sense was one designed to accomplish a governmental,
as distinguished from a proprietary, purpose. Normally, the
validity of the taking was predicated upon the payment of
fair compensation to the owner.
The first significant nationalizations of the twentieth cen­
tury were those decreed by the Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic following the revolution in 1917. In im­
portant respects the Russian Communist takings were
unique and marked a departure from prior practice ofother
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which the ordinary rules concerning nationalization do not
apply. The history and provisions of the Constantinople
Convention of 1888 have been cited as a basis for the
proposition that the Canal was immunized by treaty from
nationalization. So far as the United States government is
concerned, it has reserved its position on this question and
indicated its disposition to try to work out a practical solu-
. tion of the Canal problem which would protect the inter­
ests of all concerned.
International discussions prior to the outbreak of hostili­
ties last fall were looking toward the conclusion ofan agree­
ment which would settle both the question ofcompensation
and the commitments regarding future operation of the
Canal. Following Egypt's rejection of proposals worked
out at London by a group of user nations, the United Na­
tions Security Council on October 13, I956, adopted a
resolution-with the concurrence of Egypt-which set
forth six agreed requirements for a settlement governing
the Suez Canal. These requirements were as follows:
(I) there should be free and open transit through the Canal
without discrimination, overt or covert-this covers both political
and technical aspects;
(2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
(3) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the
politics of any country;
(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by
agreement between Egypt and the users;
(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to deve1op-
ment;
Continued on page 26
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states. The Soviet policy was to place all means of produc­
tion and significant holdings of capital in the hands of the
state as an instrument for carrying out certain political, eco­
nomic, and social theories. These early Soviet confiscations
have served as the pattern for industry-wide takings de­
signed to alter the economic and political bases of those
countries that have come under Communist control since
World War II .
Before the revolution, foreign capital invested in Russia
amounted to more than two billion rubles. This was com­
pletely lost, and all private ownership of property in the
Soviet Union was abolished. The Soviet government of­
fered no compensation to foreigners or to Russians. This
action was accomplished by force, and, once the govern­
ment proved that it was able to survive, there was little that
could be done through peaceful means to obtain redress.
Attempts were made by Russian nationals in the courts of
the United States and Britain to recover their confiscated
property which the Soviet government had sold to persons
who transported it to other forums. While there was some
early division ofdecision on the question ofwhether or not
the Soviet government obtained title, once that government
had received recognition by the states in which litigation
arose, the Soviet confiscations were brought under the
magic mantle of the "acts of state" doctrine, and all lived
happily ever after.
The second major nationalization of this century oc­
curred in Mexico. By the end of the dictatorship ofDiaz in
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(6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez
Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled
by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provi­
sions for the payment of sums found to be due; ...
Secretary-General Hammarskjold undertook to pursue
the negotiations which he had begun earlier with Britain,
France, and Egypt in order to reach a formal agreement.
On October 24 he sent a letter to the Egyptian foreign
minister elaborating a plan based on the six requirements.
On November 2 Egypt addressed a reply which accepted
the principal features of Mr. Hammarskjold's plan. Then
there was a several months' hiatus in the negotiations. In
recent weeks the exchanges with Egypt have been renewed,
with the United States participating actively. It remains to
be seen what kind of permanent regime for the Canal will
emerge and what kinds ofmachinery and remedies will be
available for the settlement of any differences regarding its
operation.
THE HOSTILITIES
The process of negotiating a Suez Canal settlement was
interrupted at the end ofOctober, 1956, by the outbreak of
hostilities, which were certainly not unrelated to the Canal
problem. These hostilities were a radical deviation from the
path of peaceful settlement.
Israel sought to justify its attack on the ground that
Egypt had repeatedly violated the armistice agreement and
that there was no other way to safeguard Israel's security.
Raids across the armistice lines from Egyptian-controlled
territory inflicted serious and continuing harassment. On
the day following the Israeli invasioh, Britain and France
delivered ultimatums to both Israel and Egypt and an­
nounced that they would land forces in Egypt to protect the
Suez Canal. President Eisenhower, on October 3 I, stated
that these actions by the three countries against Egypt could
scarcely be reconciled with the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.
The Security Council was prevented by British and
French vetoes from acting to deal with the situation. Now,
for the first time, an emergency special session of the Gen­
eral Assembly was summoned under the "Uniting for
Peace" resolution. It met on the evening ofNovember I, a
little more than twenty-four hours after it had been called.
The General Assembly, at its meetings during the emer­
gency special session and later during its eleventh regular
session, took three kinds ofaction. First, it called for a cessa­
tion ofhostilities and withdrawal ofarmed forces trom posi­
tions occupied after the fighting broke out; this the As­
sembly did on a number of occasions before the with­
drawals were finally completed. Second, the General As­
sembly established a United Nations Emergency Force to
secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. Finally, the
Assembly provided for the taking of various measures de-
signed to prevent a recurrence of old conflicts and armistice
violations once the withdrawal of forces had been com­
pleted.
We should note that the General Assembly's resolutions
calling for cease-fire and withdrawal were recommenda­
tions and not binding decisions, such as the Security Council
could make under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Yet these calls
of the Assembly were heeded-and heeded with relative
promptness by Britain and France.
Early in November, before any withdrawals occurred,
the Soviet Union proposed the use of Soviet, as well as
United States, armed forces to aid in the defense ofEgypt.
At once the United States declared its opposition to the in­
troduction of Soviet or any other military forces into the
Middle East except under United Nations mandate. It fur­
ther stated that any such move would be directly contrary
to the General Assembly's resolution of November 2 and
would violate the Charter-meaning Article 2, paragraph
4, which bans the use ofarmed force in any manner incon­
sistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The United
Nations was then dealing actively with the situation
through a General Assembly cease-fire resolution, through
efforts by the Secretary-General to secure compliance with
it, and through the setting-up of machinery to police the
cease-fire.
To secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, the
General Assembly established the United Nations Emer­
gency Force. This was an innovation in international life.
Like the United Nations forces in Korea, this new force was
composed of units contributed by member states. But the
similarity largely stopped there. The Assembly placed the
force under the command ofan individual officer chosen by
it-Canadian General Edson L. M. Burns. Costs of the
force were to be financed trom the United Nations budget
and contributions of non-participating countries (like the
United States) as well as by the countries supplying troops.
The mission of this force was laid down in a series of re­
ports prepared by the Secretary-General at the Assembly's
request and then approved by the Assembly. The Secretary­
General, in consultation with an advisory committee of
United Nations members, was to play an important part in
governing the employment of the United Nations Emer­
gency Force. This force, unlike the United Nations military
units in Korea, was not to be a combatant force. But, as an
international agency to supervise the cease-fire, it should be
free from the frustrations of the Neutral Nations Super­
visory Commission in Korea, whose operation has been
largely stalled by the veto power of its Communist mem­
bers.
Let us turn now to the arrangements made by the Gen­
eral Assembly to bring about final withdrawal by Israel and
prevent a return of the very unsatisfactory state of affairs
that existed before hostilities began. On January 24 the
Secretary-General submitted a report proposing a number
ofmeasures. Among them were the stationing of the United
Vol. 6, NO.3 The University of Chicago Law School
Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza strip and on both
sides of the armistice line and the stationing of this force at
the Strait of Tiran. This strait leads from the head of the
Red Sea into the Gulfof -Aqaba. The gulf lies just to the
east of the Sinai Peninsula, and at its north end are two
ports: CAqaba in Jordan and Eilat in Israel.
The report of the Secretary-General also recalled a Se­
curity Council resolution of 195 I declaring that there was
no basis for Egypt's claim and exercise of belligerent rights
against Israel in view of the armistice agreement. For several
years Egypt had denied passage to Israeli commerce through
the Suez Canal and had blocked Israeli access to the Gulfof
CAqaba at the Strait ofTiran.
On February 2 the General Assembly voted that the
measures proposed by the Secretary-General should be
taken. On the same day the Assembly called for the last
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time upon Israel to complete the withdrawal of its forces
behind the armistice line. Israel, however, remained unwill­
ing to withdraw from Gaza and from the coast bordering
the Straight ofTiran.
Subsequently, the United States stated its view, in a
memorandum to the Israeli government, that the Gulf of
CAqaba comprehended international waters and that there
was a right of free and innocent passage in the gulf and
through the strait giving access to it. On February 22 Mr.
Hammarskjold reported Egyptian agreement that the
United Nations' take-over in Gaza should be "exclusive"
during an initial period, despite Egypt's right ofoccupancy
under the armistice agreement, and that the United Nations
should continue to have a substantial role after this period.
On February 25 he indicated in a memorandum given to
the Assembly that the United Nations Emergency Force
would not be withdrawn from the Strait ofTiran without
prior notice to the Advisory Committee, which in turn
could decide whether the General Assembly ought to be
consulted.
On March r, following discussions with France and the
United States, Israel announced in the General Assembly
that it would complete the withdrawal of its armed forces in
accordance with the Assembly's resolutions and on the basis
of stated assumptions and expectations regarding control of
Gaza and access to the Gulf of CAqaba. In a letter to the
prime minister of Israel on March 2 President Eisenhower
expressed the view that it was reasonable to entertain hopes
and expectations such as those voiced by the Israeli and
other delegations in the Assembly.
Thus the last withdrawals were completed on the basis of
a quite complicated set of de facto arrangements arrived at
through the efforts of several governments, the United Na­
tions Secretary-General, and the processes of the General
Assembly.
Perhaps mention should be made here of the point that
the United Nations Emergency Force entered Egyptian ter­
ritory with the consent of Egypt. I believe it would be
wrong to say, as some have asserted, that a United Nations
force organized and directed by the General Assembly can
enter territory only with the sovereign's consent. Here,
however, consent was given, and this was done in an agree­
ment stating that the force should remain "until its task is
completed." This would seem to mean that Egypt is not at
liberty, unilaterally, to decide that the force shall leave when
Egypt so desires. It is for the United Nations also to decide
when the mission of the United Nations Emergency Force
is accomplished, or that for other reasons the force should be
withdrawn. We may expect that the Secretary-General
would consult the Advisory Committee before withdraw­
ing the force and that the Assembly-now in recess-might
well be reconvened to consider any such question.
OBSTRUCTION OF THE SUEZ CANAL
We have now looked at some of the principal legal prob­
lems arising during the Middle East crisis. I should perhaps
mention a few others. There is, for example, the obstruction
of the Suez Canal. After hostilities began last fall, a large
number ofvessels were sunk in the Canal, and a bridge over
it was demolished. These actions, according to available in­
formation, were taken by Egypt. Assuming the correctness
of that information, were they permissible under the Con­
stantinople Convention of r888?
Article I of the treaty provides:
The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time
ofwar as in time ofpeace, to every vessel of commerce or ofwar,
without distinction of flag.
Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any
way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time ofwar as in
time of peace.
Article IV states:
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The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free
passage, even to the ships ofwar of belligerents, according to the
terms of Article I of the present Treaty, the High Contracting
Parties agree that no right ofwar, no act of hostility, nor any act
having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal,
shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as
within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the
Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.
Article IX gave the Turkish and Egyptian authorities the
right to take measures "for securing by their own forces the
defense of Egypt and the maintenance of public order."
But Article XI specified that these measures "shall not inter­
fere with the free use of the Canal."
Was Egypt, therefore, entitled to block the Canal? Is
Egypt liable to maritime nations for the losses they have
suffered in consequence? Is Egypt liable for losses resulting
from its action in slowing down the process of clearing the
Canal after that was undertaken by the United Nations at
Egypt's request? These are questions which do not seem
likely to receive direct answers in any international judicial
proceedings.
In connection with the clearing of the Canal, it is worth
noting that the United Nations undertook the 'job upon a
request from Egypt. The United Nations then solicited and
obtained advances of funds to defray the cost of clearing.
The United States advanced $5,000,000 out of a total of
approximately $12,000,000. The question remains un­
solved as to how these advances will be repaid.
Then there is the question of "war damages" which
Egypt has talked of claiming. Egyptian spokesmen have
charged Israel, France, and Britain with liability for loss of
life and property occurring in Egypt during the hostilities.
Egyptian representatives at the United Nations circulated a
proposal in December, I956, to have the Secretary-General
make a survey of damage.
It should be evident, in connection with any proposal to
settle claims for war damages, that there are many other
claims-such as those relating to nationalization of the Suez
Canal, to loss and damage caused by raids across the arrni­
stice lines, to destroyed pipelines, to the "Egyptianization"
decrees, and perhaps to economic losses from closure of the
Canal. It would be only just that all these should be adjudi­
cated together if ever there is to be litigation.
There seems to be a possibility of adjudication concern­
ing transit through the Canal and passage through the Strait
ofTiran and GulfofCAqaba. Israel has indicated its intention
to attempt such transit and passage for Israeli commerce,
while indications ofcontinuing opposition have come from
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Submission to the International
Court ofJustice has been suggested.
CONCLUSION
As we look back over the events of the Middle East crisis,
we may observe that governments have focused attention
upon substantive questions of international law and upon
legal-as distinct from forcible-means of dealing with
them. There has been emphasis on solution of problems
within a framework oflaw, with reliance on the Charter of
the United Nations and the operation of its organs.
What significance is discernible here? First, I suppose it
may be said that governments have employed the discourse
of international law because they thought it relevant to the
problems and useful in public presentation of their positions.
In other words, international law was considered enough of
a reality that they must reckon with it.
A second point to be noted is that international debate
and consideration of legal questions can produce develop­
ments in the body of international law. A consensus may
emerge where there were not generally agreed views before
or where the field had not previously been plowed. This
process has perhaps taken place to some extent during the
Middle East crisis.
How has the law operated during the Middle East crisis?
We might look, for example, at the withdrawal of British
and French, and ultimately Israeli, forces. In the General
Assembly debate a preponderance ofopinion was marshaled
in support of the law of the Charter and given expression in
the Assembly's resolutions calling for cease-fire and with­
drawal. Behind these resolutions lay the threat of United
Nations sanctions, which are open to the Assembly under
Articles 10 and I I of the Charter and are contemplated by
the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. Israel, France, and
Britain were subjected by other countries to strong pres­
sures to comply with the Assembly's call-various and di­
vergent as might have been the aims of those other coun­
tries.
In a situation ofgreat peril, because of the possibility of a
spreading. of the conflict, the nations in effect agreed to
apply the law of the Charter. This did not result from the
direct application of definitive rules by an international
agency endowed with governmental power as we know it
in domestic law. Much negotiation was involved, both in­
side and outside the United Nations, as to the means of
applying the basic proposition that military forces should be
withdrawn behind the armistice lines. This was done in or­
der to take account of legitimate concerns and interests on
both sides regarding security and legal rights: In the end,
common ground was reached, and the law had pragmatic
effect.
The forum of the United Nations and the good offices of
the Secretary-General proved a valuable catalyst in the
process. We should note here, from the constitutional point
of view, that the office and functions of the Secretary-Gen­
eral have developed considerably in scope and influence
during the last few months. It is possible that the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, the International
Court ofJustice, will have an increased role to play in the
future.
United Nations rules and processes for dealing with in­
ternational conflicts tend toward the elimination of the use
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of armed force. This is surely a development to be wel­
comed. Once again the comparison with Korea suggests it­
self In the Middle East, as in Korea, there has been no effec­
tive military victory for either side. An armistice is once
again in effect. The question remains how this uneasy situa­
tion can be stabilized and progress be made toward a,
durable settlement.
There is a pressing need for the community ofnations to
find, develop, and employ effective means to make just and
viable settlements of the problems to which force was once
applied as the solvent. Unless this is done, we cannot be
confident that the ground seemingly won will be held­
that the world's hold on peace is secure. Groping efforts
toward peace with justice are discernible in the arrange­
ments made by the United Nations to try to establish peace­
ful conditions between Israel and Egypt. We shall have to
wait longer to judge the outcome-whether it holds real
hope because the nations of the world are determined that
their common efforts shall succeed or whether some new
beginnings must be made.
The web of history is slowly woven.
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19II (1877-19II) all the land in Mexico was owned by
some one thousand powerful families. Article 27 ofthe 1917
constitution laid the foundation for agrarian reform and the
expropriation of foreign-held land and oil interests. It gave
only Mexicans, or foreigners who were by special agree­
ment to be treated as Mexicans without recourse to their
own governments, the right to acquire ownership in or ex­
ploit Mexican natural resources. The constitution further
provided for expropriation of private property tor reasons
ofpublic utility. Confiscations were forbidden. In I923 the
United States accepted compensation in the form of federal
bonds for certain lands, and a commission was set up to
adjudicate claims, though it never settled any. By 1938 the
Mexican government had "nationalized" moderate-sized
holdings estimated by their United States owners to be
worth ten million dollars. Three million dollars was finally
paid by Mexico to satisfy these claims.
Parallel to the land questions, though handled separately
and raising different legal problems, was the expropriation
of oil rights that had been granted to various foreign com­
panies prior to I9I9. At that time the owner of the surface
had right to the subsurface minerals. Article 27 vested the
nation with all the subsurface rights, but it was held not to
be retroactive in effect. Mexico tried to restrict the length of
time that the foreign concessions could run to fifty years by
requiring that the concessions be confirmed by concessions
which would be granted by the Mexican government.
Long diplomatic correspondence followed, and the law was
finally declared unconstitutional in certain parts in 1927. A
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new law was passed whereby the concessions were to be
confirmed by "issuing," not "granting," confirmatory con­
cessions without limitation of time. The question then
seemed settled for some years, until I936, when President
Cardenas had carried the agrarian reform near completion
and turned his attention to other matters. On March 18,
1938, the Labor Board declared all oil-company labor con­
tracts canceled, and President Cardenas signed the expropri­
ation decree expropriating the foreign oil companies' inter­
ests in Mexico.
The expropriation had its immediate origin in a labor
controversy but was really an expression of the second ob­
jective of the Mexican revolution, the "Mexicanization of
industry." The expropriation of oil, unlike the expropria­
tion ofland, did not affect Mexican and foreigner equally,
as only the foreign oil interests were nationalized. The
United States recognized the right ofMexico to expropri­
ate the oil resources but, as in the land question, demanded
that prompt and just payment be made. Mexico had argued
in the land question that all the foreigner could ask was
equality of treatment with the national but admitted liabil­
ity to compensate. The issue Was finally resolved in a similar
fashion to the land question.
It is significant to note that, so far as the oil expropria­
tions were concerned, Mexico breached valid concession
agreements with oil companies in this and other countries.
But, recognizing a "sovereign" power in Mexico to ter­
minate the agreements, the United States government
pressed only for compensation and did not question the
basic abrogation of contractual obligations by the govern­
ment.
